

Self-Consciousness and Mutual Recognition

That the subject, or the I, is not an object in the world is one of the most fundamental insights in philosophy. It is also one of the most difficult. It is an insight that is often associated with Kant, and with later German Idealism, but it is also prevalent in the French tradition and in early analytic philosophy. In this conference, participants will discuss the questions: How can we develop accounts of selfconsciousness and mutual recognition that do justice to this insight? What is it to be conscious of ourselves as subjects of thinking and of acting? And how do we recognize others as subjects? The questions will be approached through discussion of the history of philosophy and through its development in more recent approaches from contemporary philosophy. The conference is interdisciplinary in its reach, because it is only by answering these fundamental questions about selfconsciousness and mutual recognition that we can begin to understand the different ways in which we learn about ourselves and about others in the more specialized humanistic disciplines.

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